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1.   In separate notes in the last issue of this Commentary, 
Midwinter and Simpson attempted to allay concerns we 
had raised about, respectively, the strategic review of water 
charges for 2002-06 and 2006-10: (Midwinter, 2006 and 
Simpson, 2006). Here, we show how their notes do nothing 
to allay the concerns we have raised, and indeed, in certain 
respects, give rise to further causes for concern. 
 
a. Paper by Midwinter 
2.   First, it is useful to recapitulate on the normal principle 
of equity and prudence as regards borrowing: an equitable 
and prudent level of borrowing would normally equate to 
the amount of new capital assets being created: that is, to 
the quantity (Investment - Depreciation). This is a principle 
with which the Executive are in accord: for example, 
“Ministers want to ensure that the balance between 
charges and borrowing remains appropriate, and hence the 
total borrowing should approximate to the value of new 
assets over the strategic review period”: (internal Scottish 
Executive memo, dated 3
rd 
February 2004, obtained under 
Freedom of Information.) 
 
We do not argue, and have not argued, that this is a 
mechanistic principle which should be rigidly applied in all 
circumstances: but any large departure of borrowing from 
the level of new investment does raise serious questions 
about prudence or equity. 
 
3.   In 2003, the basic concern we raised in our original 
paper was that the planned level of borrowing in the 
Strategic Review of Charges 2002-2006, (SR2002), at 
£293.3 million in total over the four years, was apparently 
much less than what would, on the above principle, 
normally have been regarded as appropriate for the 
industry - implying significant over-charging of customers. 
The Executive's reaction, in evidence given to the Finance 
Committee on 3rd February 2004, was that the normal 
principle of prudence would indeed apply: planned 
investment in total over the 4 years was £1.8 billion, 
depreciation would be £1.2 billion, giving a level of creation 
of new capital assets of £600 million: and borrowing would 
be at around this level. In fact, the outturn figures from 
Scottish Water’s accounts, which are now available (SW 
Annual Accounts), show that the Executive was wrong on 
both counts: with outturn investment at £1.915 billion, and 
depreciation at £1.017 billion, the creation of net new 
capital assets has been almost exactly £900 million: but net 
new borrowing over the period was only £337 million. (Note 
that depreciation here is used in the wide sense, including 
both conventional depreciation of fixed assets, and 
infrastructure renewal.) Hence the outturn figures show that 
we, and not the Executive, were right about what was 
going to happen: counter to the Executive’s claim, the 
normal principle of equity was grossly violated. 
 
Further, by 2006, we had uncovered much more evidence, 
and in Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2006a) we identified, gave 
full supporting references to, and quantified the effects of, 
no less than five fundamental errors in the application of 
Resource Accounting and Budgeting (RAB), and in the 
conduct of SR2002, which had led to the basic problem. 
For details of these errors, and their effects see the article 
referred to. 
 
4.   It is against this background that we can now see how 
bizarre Midwinter’s latest note is. He does not mention the 
outturn figures from Scottish Water, which show that about 
£600 million of net new capital formation had been funded 
from revenue: and of the five errors we identified in our 
2006 paper, he attempts a detailed rebuttal of only one of 
these, which in itself would account for around £180 million 
of the total £600 million: and, as we shall see, he fails to 
rebut this particular error. 
 
In terms of an analogy, as the lumbering plane that was 
SR2002 took to the air in 2003, we said that the plane was 
going to crash, and we duly provided five reasons why. The 
Scottish Executive, for their part, said everything would be 
fine. In 2006, Midwinter stands, studiously ignoring the 
smouldering wreckage in terms of the outturn figures at the 
end of the runway, and tries to convince us that everything 
is OK, by attempting to refute just one of the reasons we 
had given why this machine was not airworthy. 
 
5.   We now consider in more detail the only one of the 
errors identified in Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2006a) which 
Midwinter attempts to rebut: technically, this related to the 
effects of double-counting infrastructure renewal 
expenditure (IRE) within the combined limit for public 
expenditure set in SR2002. Again, full details are set out in 
the paper referred to. 
 
6.   Midwinter’s attempted refutation essentially hinges on 
three assertions: 
 
a.   First of all, that the Treasury specifically endorsed the 
Scottish Executive’s approach: so there could be no double 
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counting.  This argument has been disposed of by work we 
have already done. In correspondence between ourselves 
and the Treasury, which can be found at on the Finance 
Committee website, (under the papers for the meeting of 
28 June 2005, doc ref F1/S2/05/17/5), the final letter from 
the Treasury makes it clear that their endorsement extends 
only to the Scottish Executive’s treatment of the water 
industry in the Scottish Executive’s overall Departmental 
Expenditure Limit accounts, and not to any specific 
financial controls the Scottish Executive may have devised 
for Scottish Water. So the Treasury letters Midwinter cites 
are totally irrelevant to the present argument; 
 
b.   Midwinter’s second argument is that there was no 
double counting because the Executive’s control over 
Scottish Water was not in fact through a combined limit, 
since, to quote, “the Commissioning Letter of 2001 simply 
states that the Executive’s limit is on borrowing of £314 
million plus profits. This is not a combined figure, as the 
controls on each element are separate and can be varied, 
e.g., through supplementary borrowing consents or 
increased profits.” 
 
The crucial point is that the Scottish Executive did not 
make any supplementary adjustment to the public 
expenditure control limit for Scottish Water during the 
critical period when the Water Industry Commissioner was 
setting the revenue caps, even though the WIC was 
predicting a substantial increase in the IRE element of 
depreciation: (and incidentally, also in the non-IRE 
element).  Hence, the double counting squeeze on 
borrowing, resulting from the combined control, did apply, 
invalidating Midwinter’s second argument. 
(Midwinter actually makes another mistake in this 
quotation, in that the figure of £314 million does not 
represent borrowing); 
 
c.   Midwinter’s third assertion is that IRE is not in fact part 
of depreciation: to quote, “The authors’ assumption that 
spending on infrastructure renewal expenditure was part of 
depreciation was mistaken as it was a cash item of 
expenditure in the capital budget.” It is interesting that 
Midwinter gives no authority for this assertion, and this is a 
point we return to below. Midwinter’s statement, however, 
is demonstrably untrue: for example, the Annex to Cuthbert 
and Cuthbert (2006a) sets out a detailed audit trail, 
showing how IRE scores both in capital expenditure, and in 
the depreciation figure used for calculating profit, in the 
WIC’s calculation of the public expenditure implications of 
his revenue caps. Further, Scottish Water’s accounts for 
2002-03 contain calculations of outturn against the public 
expenditure RAB control total where what is calculated is 
(investment - profit), and where IRE is both included in 
investment and, as part of depreciation, scores against 
profit. 
 
7.   As noted above, Midwinter quotes no authority for his 
assertion that IRE did not count against depreciation. The 
following excerpt from a document which we obtained from 
the Scottish Executive under Freedom of Information may 
be relevant to this: 
 
Internal Scottish Executive memo, Scott to Egdell and 
Greenhill, 3
rd 
March 2004, Finance Committee: Water 
 
“1) I need to go back to Arthur Midwinter - sotto voce - on 
his latest briefing paper to the Finance Committee by the 
end of the week. Please could you take a look at his paper, 
coming round to you in hard copy, and let me have the text 
of a reply by close tomorrow. Arthur showed me this draft in 
confidence. 
 
2) Arthur has also given me a copy of the Cuthberts’ latest 
paper. At a glance there seems to be nothing new in it. But 
again, I would like you to take a look at it in more detail, 
and set out where it goes wrong. ….” 
 
We do not know what briefing Midwinter may have 
received from the Executive, sotto voce or otherwise, 
before advising the Finance Committee on these issues. 
But we do now know, from the Scottish Executive papers 
released under FoI, that some of the internal views being 
circulated within the Executive at this time were patently 
wrong. So any briefing which Midwinter received from the 
Executive at this stage could have been wrong or 
misleading. Midwinter should now consider whether he 
wishes to make public the content of any briefing he 
received on this topic from the Executive. 
 
It is a matter of concern to us, and may be to others, that at 
the time when the crucial arguments on this topic were 
going on in the Finance Committee, it was certainly not 
clear to us that the advisor to the Committee, namely 
Arthur Midwinter, may have been being privately briefed on 
this subject by the Scottish Executive. 
 
8.   Overall, our conclusion on the Midwinter note is that he 
bizarrely ignores the outturn figures which are available: 
only attempts to address one of the five substantive errors 
we have uncovered: and fails on each of his arguments on 
that specific error. 
 
b.  Paper by Simpson 
9.   In our paper Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2006b) we argued 
that it was inappropriate for the Water Industry 
Commission, in carrying out the strategic review of charges 
for 2006-10, to apply to a publicly owned body like Scottish 
Water the same financial ratios and targets which Ofwat 
applied to the privatised water and sewage companies in 
England. 
 
10.   Much of the argumentation in Simpson’s paper 
involves setting up a series of straw men, which he then 
knocks down. Let us dispose of some of these relatively 
quickly. 
 
In paragraph 2 of his paper, Simpson says that “their main 
assertion … appears to be based on a general proposition 
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that net new capital formation should always be wholly 
funded from borrowing.”  In fact, we have never said this - 
though, as noted above, gross departures from this 
principle need to be justified. 
 
Again in paragraph 2, Simpson says “few householders, for 
example, would think it prudent in all circumstances to 
borrow 100% of the cost of their new home”, implying that 
we might advocate such a course of action. But Simpson 
neglects to point out that the private householder, facing 
grave individual uncertainties regarding income and health, 
is in a very different situation from a monopoly supplier of 
an essential commodity. So, a water company would be 
much less likely to depart from the normal prudential 
principle on borrowing than an individual would. 
 
Again in paragraph 2, “the Cuthberts’ view seems to be 
that Scottish Water should borrow whatever monies are 
available from the Executive.” We have in fact never said 
anything like this. 
 
In paragraph 3, “the Cuthberts appear to take the view that 
either (a) investment in the public sector is risk free, or (b) 
that the water industry is a risk free area.” We certainly do 
not think this, nor have we ever said anything like this. 
However, it is interesting to note that Simpson quotes 
examples like Yorkshire Water - but fails to mention 
something which we see daily in the newspapers, namely, 
the levels of profit in the water and sewage companies 
which make them such attractive takeover propositions 
In paragraph 5, “they appear to suggest that in Scotland 
water charges should be set artificially low”. Absolutely not: 
but we do argue (see below), that prices could be set at a 
lower level on a sustainable basis. 
 
11.   Straw men aside, Simpson puts forward essentially 
three main arguments to justify the revenue caps in 
SR2006, as follows: 
 
a)   There is a very unsophisticated dismissal of the inter- 
generational problem, which can be summed up in the 
following two quotations: 
 
“The Cuthberts’ criticisms can be summarised in the 
proposition that Scottish Water should be allowed to 
borrow more money”, and “Of course, if the level of 
borrowing is increased, this just means that charges must 
go up in the future to make the deferred repayments of 
capital plus interest on the borrowing.” 
 
The two quotations taken together imply an altogether too 
simplistic treatment of the genuinely difficult problem of 
balancing the interests of current and future consumers. 
Taking Simpson’s approach to its logical conclusion would 
imply borrowing nothing at all, and funding all capital 
expenditure from current revenue. (While this may seem 
ridiculous, it was in fact exactly the position which would 
have been reached by 2006 in the projected figures in 
SR2002: see Table 32.4 in that document.) 
In fact, the second quotation is in itself staggering, as well 
as being misleading, because it implies that Professor 
Simpson does not understand that, under the model used 
by the WIC, future customers will have to pay the 
equivalent of repayment of capital, (and at current prices), 
whether the original investment had been funded from 
revenue or borrowing. 
 
b)   There is an argument which boils down to saying, trust 
us, we know what we are doing. One particular paragraph 
begins “These numbers are not just plucked out of thin air. 
They are the result of three years hard work…” This sort of 
special pleading is really out of place if this purports to be a 
serious paper: and it is quite incredible that, despite three 
years work, SR2006 contains such limited discussion on 
the vital issue, which we attempted to address, as to 
whether it is appropriate to apply the unmodified Ofwat 
ratios and targets to Scottish Water. 
 
c)   There is an argument that “Ofwat applies its financial 
ratios equally to Welsh Water, although that company has 
only a nominal equity layer, and can therefore only be 
financed by a mixture of debt and revenue”. Aside from 
assuming a degree of infallibility for Ofwat which may well 
be unjustified, this argument neglects the fact that Welsh 
Water has to borrow at market rates, rather than at 
privileged public sector borrowing rates - one of the key 
differences whose implications are quantified in our paper. 
This argument also neglects the fact that, as Ofwat 
themselves say, (Ofwat 2005), “Public sector companies 
can often support much lower levels of interest cover than 
private concerns because of the lower risks”. 
 
12.   We conclude, therefore, that Simpson’s arguments 
carry no weight. There is little else in Simpson’s paper 
which bears on the substantive concerns we had raised. 
Simpson’s paper fails in its attempt to rebut our arguments. 
 
13.   Two further aspects of Simpson’s paper raise wider 
concerns. 
 
The first is illustrated by the following quotation: “So far as 
price is concerned, most households probably do not know 
the amounts that they pay annually for water and waste 
water services, which are combined with their council tax 
bill. And there are not many businesses for whom water is 
one of their major costs.” 
 
There is plenty of evidence that, despite this quotation, 
water charges are a matter of immense significance to 
many businesses, both large and small: and also to many 
domestic users. So this quotation, coming from the Deputy 
Chairman of the Water Industry Commission for Scotland, 
the body responsible for price setting, is seriously worrying. 
 
14.   The second relates to the quotation “Finally, they 
appear to suggest that in Scotland water charges should 
be set artificially low to attract water intensive industries. To 
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do this would be likely to invite the disapproval of both the 
environmental and the competition authorities in Europe”. 
As already noted, we have never advocated that water 
prices should be subsidised: so this statement is, at one 
level, simply factually wrong. But at another level, it betrays 
a worrying ignorance of the price setting regime options 
which are potentially open to the Water Industry 
Commission. SR2006 represents a move to the Regulatory 
Capital Value method of pricing, as implemented by Ofwat 
for the water industry in England since the mid 1990s. 
However, there are in fact two basic versions of the RCV 
method, one (like that used by Ofwat) based on current 
cost accounting, the other on historic cost accounting. Both 
versions are approved by the World Bank, and both are 
applied in different parts of the European Union, (though 
interestingly, it appears to be the UK which is the 
stronghold of the current cost version). There would 
therefore be no problem, from an EU perspective, in 
applying either version anywhere in the EU. 
There is, however, increasing evidence that the current 
cost version of the RCV is fundamentally flawed, 
generating excess profits on capital investment, and 
leading to overcharging of customers, and distortions in the 
capital programmes of the affected utilities. Evidence for 
these effects of the current cost RCV approach can be 
found in the excess profits of the water and sewage 
companies in England: but see Cuthbert (2006) and 
Cuthbert and Cuthbert (2007)  for a more technical 
analysis. What we are arguing is not that water charges in 
Scotland should be subsidised: but that consideration 
should be given to moving towards the application of 
historic cost RCV in setting water charges in Scotland. In 
the longer term, this would lead to significantly lower 
charges, and would be fully sustainable in the public 
sector, well within the current levels of public expenditure 
provision. 
 
15.   But to go back to Simpson’s paper, what is extremely 
worrying is his apparent ignorance of the issues and 
options surrounding the possible implementation of 
different versions of the RCV approach: and the complete 
lack in SR2006, and in his paper, of any discussion of the 
resulting issues and choices which need to be faced. So 
we draw the additional conclusion, that there needs to be a 
complete shake up of the regulatory system for the water 
industry in Scotland. 
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